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Abstract.    This paper proposes a new intrusion detection  methodology based on hybrid of differential evolution (DE) 
and group method of data handling (GMDH). It focuses on intrusion detection based on system call sequences using 
text processing techniques. The hybrid DE-GMDH is used to classify a process as either normal or abnormal. This 
work presents the application of PCA and hybrid DE-GMDH to modeling high dimensional bench-mark DARPA-1998 
database. For modeling and classifying the data, we adopted this combination of two stage PCA and hybrid DE-GMDH 
procedure. The presented technique shows significantly better results than other existing techniques avaliable in the 
literature in achieving lower false positive rates at 100% detection rate. 
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1 Introduction 
 
With the widespread use of networked computers and the rapid growth of attacks on computers, intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) have received remarkable attention in recent years. There are two types of IDS depending on the audit 
data. The network-based systems collect data directly from the network that is being monitored while the host-based 
systems collect data from the host being protected. Also, IDS can be classified based on the modeling methods used: 
misuse or signature-based and anomaly or behavior-based detection. In misuse or signature-based detection, the 
signatures of known attacks in the database are kept and compared with new instances to determine if there are attacks. 
In anomaly or behavior-based detection, the normal behavior of the monitored system is learnt to determine if there is 
any deviation in it for signs of intrusions. An important feature of anomaly behavior is that it can detect unknown 
attacks and hence it is preferred to signature-based behavior. Behavior modeling can be done by either modeling the 
user behavior or process. Process behavior modeling requires system call data usage. Host-based anomaly detection 
systems mostly focus on system call sequences with the assumption that a malicious activity results in abnormal trace. 
Generally, such data can be collected by logging the system calls using operating system utilities such as Linux strace 
or Solaris basic security module (BSM) and the assumption is that the normal behavior can be profiled by a set of 
patterns of sequence of system calls. Any deviation from the normal pattern is termed an intrusion in the framework of 
anomaly-based IDS. An intrusion detection system needs to learn from the previously collected data and this is 
accomplished by data mining or machine learning techniques. It is generally accepted that the problem of intrusion 
detection boils down to a supervised classification problem to identify anomalous sequences, which are measurably 
different from the normal behaviors. 
A first published work on behavior-based intrusion detection is by Denning [1]. Although anomaly-based IDS is 
preferred to signature-based IDS, the former is known to have unacceptable false positive rate than the later [2-3]. The 
reason postulated is the fact that it is hard to perfectly model a normal behavior. Consequently, a lot of research is being 
done in the area of anomaly-based IDS [2]. Lane and Brodley [4] propose an approach for capturing behavior of a user. 
Forrest et al. [5-6] introduce a simple anomaly detection method based on monitoring the system calls invoked by 
active and privileged processes.  
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Lee et al. [7] followed similar approach but use a rule learner for classification. In addition, data mining approach 
[8], hidden markov model (HMM) approach [9], rough set technique [10], variable length subsequence approach [11], 
discriminant method [12], principal component analysis (PCA) [13] have been used to solve the IDS problem. More 
recently, similarity measure-based approaches have been used by Liao and Vemuri [14-15]; robust support vector 
machine (RSVM) has been used by Wenjie et al. [16]; Rawat et al. [17] proposed a very efficient anomaly-based hot-
based intrusion detection system, and kernel based similarity measures have been used by Sharma et al. [18]. 
In the work reported in this paper, we propose an intrusion detection methodology based on hybrid of differential 
evolution (DE) and group method of data handling (GMDH). The major contributions of our work are (a) the 
introduction of a novel method that does not use similarity measures based on commonality and frequency of occurence 
of system calls and (b) realizing an anomaly-based IDS that gives an acceptably low false positive rate. We confirm our 
claims of better IDS by experimental analysis of the results of the proposed approach and other existing techniques in 
the literature. 
 
2 The DDR Hybrid DE-GMDH Scheme for Intrusion Detection 
 
The data dimensional reduction (DDR) hybrid DE-GMDH algorithm that is proposed for intrusion detection in this 
paper consists of three components: (i) the DDR for data dimensional reduction; (ii) the DE structural optimization 
module; (iii) the GMDH parametric optimization module. 
 
2.1 PCA for Data Dimensional Reduction Module of Host being Protected 
 
PCA finds a linear transformationΦwhich reduces d-dimensional data to h-dimensional feature vectors (where dh < ) 
in such a way that the information is maximally preserved in minimum mean squared error sense. This linear 
transformation is known as PCA transform or Karhunen-Loéve transform (KLT) [19].  Since the transformation is from 
d-dimensional feature space to h-dimensional feature space the size of Φ is hd × . The h column vectors of the matrix 
are the basis vectors. The first basis vector is in the direction of maximum variance of the given feature vectors. The 
remaining basis vectors are mutually orthogonal and, in order, maximize the remaining variances subject to the 
orthogonal condition. Each basis vector represents a principal axis. These principal axes are those orthonormal axes 
onto which the remaining variances under projection are maximum. These orthonormal axes are given by the 
dominant/leading eigenvectors (i.e. those with the largest associated eigenvalues) of the measured covariance matrix. In 
PCA, original feature space is characterized by these basis vectors and the number of basis vectors used for 
characterization is usually less than the dimensionality d of the feature space (see Sharma at el. [20]; Sharma and 
Paliwal [21]).  
Φ
 
In intrusion detection systems analysis where there is need to learn the normal behavior patterns from the previously 
collected (usually large) data, the PCA technique is applied for two main reasons   
 
(i) the basis vectors that are of less importance can be discarded which would help in reducing the noise that 
could be present in IDS data. 
(ii) To overcome the singularity issue related with the direct application of GMDH parametric optimization.  
 
The PCA transform can be found by minimizing mean squared error. To see this, let the feature vector be dRx∈ (d-
dimensional space), reduced dimensional feature vector be hRz∈  and reconstructed feature vector be dRxˆ∈ . Then the 
mean squared error can be represented as 
 
       (1) ]||xˆx[|| 2MSE −= E
 
where  is the expectation operation with respect to x and is the norm squared value. We know that PCA 
transformation is of size and it is used to do dimensionality reduction from d-dimensional space to h-
dimensional feature space, i.e. or  
][•E 2|||| •
Φ hd ×
zx:Φ →
 
xΦz T=       (2) 
 
The PCA transformation can be obtained by minimizing mean squared error which turns out to be a 
generalized eigenvalue problem i.e.: 
Φ ]||xˆx[|| 2−E
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where , R},...,,:{φΦ hjj 21== ∈jφ d, and xΣ is covariance matrix of all input d-dimensional vectors. The expression 
 denotes eigenvalues corresponding to . The eigenvectors of should be arranged such that their 
corresponding eigenvalues are in descending order
jλ jφ )φ,...,(φ h1 Φ
hλλλ >>> ...21 . This arrangement is, however, not a necessary step 
for PCA but it is mentioned here since the model conducts this arrangement process prior to the application of GMDH 
parametric optimization. Sharma and Onwubolu [22] presented this PCA approach for modeling; it was implemented in 
the work reported in this paper. 
 
2.2 The Group Method of Data Handling 
 
The GMDH was first developed by Ivakhnenko [23] as a multivariate analysis method for complex system analysis 
modeling and identification. In this way, GMDH was used to circumvent the difficulty of knowing a priori knowledge 
of mathematical model of the process being considered. Therefore, GMDH can be used to model complex systems 
without having specific knowledge of the system. In a system identification problem, assume that a single valued output 
y (classes, in our case), of an unknown system, behaves as a function of m input values (samples of features in the 
reduced dimensional space, in our case), such that  
( )mzzzfy ,...,, 21=       (4) 
Given n training observations of these input-output data pairs ( ) mjniyz iij ,...,2,1;,...,2,1;; ==  then the system 
identification problem is to approximate the function f  with an approximate function referred to as the complete form. 
In the application under consideration in this paper, define the attributes (features) while define the class of 
labels. The GMDH approach is one of the heuristic algorithms primarily designed to solve the system identification 
problem. This section illustrates the conventional GMDH approach. To illustrate the technique, let be z = 
 the h-dimensional feature vector and let its corresponding label (state of nature) be y. According to the 
GMDH paradigm the relationship between the input vector z and its label y can be represented by an infinite Volterra-
Kolmogorov-Gabor (VKG) polynomial of the form [23]:  
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where  are coefficients or weights of this (so called) multiple inputs single output self-organizing 
network. This is the discrete-time analogue of a continuous time Volterra series and can be used to approximate any 
stationary random sequence of physical measurements. Ivakhnenko showed that the VKG series can be expressed as a 
cascade of second order polynomials using only pairs of variables [23]. The corresponding network can be constructed 
from simple polynomial and delay elements. As the learning procedure evolves, branches that do not contribute 
significantly to the specific output can be pruned, thereby allowing only the dominant causal relationship to evolve.  
...,,0 ijkiji aaaa
 
In the classical GMDH algorithm, there is the need to construct  new variables 
in the training dataset for all independent variables (columns of
( ) 2/1
2
−=⎟⎠
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⎛= mmmα
,...,,,, 321 αyyyy Z ), two at a time so that there 
are n data triples of the form ( ) ( ) nirsmsryzz iisir ,...,2,1;;,...,2,1,;;, =>∈ .  The mathematical description of these two 
new variables or neurons represented by quadratic polynomials is of the form 
isirisirisiri zzazazazazaay 5
2
4
2
3210ˆ +++++= at points ( )siri zz ,, ,       (6) 
The matrix formulation of this system of equation is simply, Za = Y where a = [ ]Taaaaaa 543210 ,,,,, is the vector of 
coefficients. The least square technique from multiple-regression analysis provides the most fundamental formula to 
obtain the coefficients in the following form: a = (ZTZ)-1ZTY. 
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2.3 Differential Evolution Scheme 
 
The differential evolution (DE) algorithm introduced by Storn and Price [24] is a novel parallel direct search method, 
which utilizes Np parameter vectors as a population for each generation G. It was primarily designed for continuous 
domain space formulation. The steps involved in the classical DE are summarized here 
Step 1: Initialization; 
Step 2: Mutation; 
Step 3: Crossover; 
Step 4: Selection; 
Step 5: Stopping criteria. 
 
2.3.1 Permutative-based DE 
Permutative-based DE differs from continuous DE due to the fact that it can handle permutative-based type 
combinatorial optimization problems. The mechanisms to cater for this are mainly the way in which initialiation is done 
together with two other schemes for transformation from permutation form into continuous form in Step 2 in Section 
2.3 and transformation from continuous form into permutation form after Step 2 in Section 2.3 [25]. 
 
2.3.2 Enhanced Permutative-based DE 
As the name implies, the enhanced permutative-based DE uses the same basis as the permutative-based DE except that 
it has more enhancement strategies [26]. 
 
2.4 The Hybrid DE-GMDH Scheme 
 
Although GMDH has been applied to solving the classification problem (see for example, Lemke and Mueller, 
2003)[27] the results obtained were not as promising as expected due to the fact that classical GMDH has its strength in 
regression problems rather than in classication problems. The hybrid DE-GMDH scheme introduced by Onwubolu [28-
29] (see Figure 1) overcomes the shortcomings of the conventional GMDH algorithm for the intrusion detection 
classification problem described in Section 3. It comprises of several components including structural and parametric 
optimization schemes. The current version has the module described in Section 2.1, as its pre-processor module. The 
elements of the reduced dimensional feature vector of hRz∈ are candidates for entry in a pair-wise manner to the 
hybrid DE-GMDH modeling system. 
 
2.4.1 Structural Optimization with DE 
 
    The DE design is responsible for selecting the number of input variables (attributes), selection of the input variables 
(attributes), and selection of polynomial order (linear, quadratic, trilinear, tri-quadratic, etc.). From iteration 
(generation) to iteration (generation) of the DE, the best nodes (neurons) are automatically found based on regression 
and parametric optimization, and progress is made until termination conditions are satisfied. 
 
    The summary of the overall architecture (Figure 1) of the hybrid DE-GMDH modeling system is as follows: 
 
Step 1: Reduce the high dimensional dataset from d to h dimension using PCA pre-processor (Section 2.1) 
Step 2: Initialize a population of discrete trial solutions (Section 2.3) 
Step 3: Evaluate the objective function (fitness) for each discrete current solutions in the population (Section 2.2) 
Step 4: Convert the permutative-based current solutions into continuous current solutions (Section 2.3.2) 
Step 5: Apply DE strategy to transform current solutions into new solutions using the inbuilt crossover and mutation 
schemes (Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2) 
Step 6: Convert the continuous new solutions into permutative-based new solutions (Section 2.3.2) 
Step 7: Repair solutions to realize discrete new solutions of unique values (Section 2.3.2) 
Step 8: Improve solutions through standard crossover and mutation schemes (Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2) 
Step 9: Execute steps 2—7 until reaching a specified cut-off limit on the total number of iterations 
Step 10: Improve solutions further through local search routine (Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2) 
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Fig. 1. Overall architecture of the hybrid DE-GMDH modeling system 
 
    To understand network realization let us take an example. Suppose we have input dataset of 5 dimensional vectors 
(record). Each vector has only and only one output. Take a scenario where the order of the polynomial is 2 and the 
number of inputs to a node is 2. Then, the inputs to a node(neuron) are shown in Table 1 which are just for layer 1. The 
DE mechanics detailed in Section 2.2.1 are vehicles for propagating the network from layer to layer. 
 
Tab. 1. Inputs to a node(neuron) 
Vectors Solution vectors Node(neuron) inputs 
Vector 1 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 5, 4  
Vector 2 1, 3, 5, 4, 2 1, 3 
Vector 3 2, 1, 4, 5, 3 2, 1 
Vector 4 4, 3, 1, 5, 2 4, 3 
Vector 5 1, 5, 2, 3, 4 1, 5 
  
2.4.2 Parametric Optimization with GMDH 
 
The objective function (performance index) is a basic instrument guiding the evolutionary search in the solution 
space. For the third solution vector (see Table 1) the generated polynomial would be: 
2   
16
2
251241322112 ),( xcxcxxcxcxccxxf +++++=
where c1,c2,…,c6 are the constants evaluated using training dataset. As discussed in Section 2, the least square 
technique from multiple-regression analysis provides the formula to obtain the coefficients in the following form: c = 
(XTX)-1XTY.  
 
2.5 Procedure of the General Learning DE- GMDH Algorithm 
 
The general learning procedure for constructing the DE-GMDH model can be described as follows: 
(1) Create an initial population randomly (DE structures and its corresponding learning parameters). 
(2) Structural optimization is achieved by the DE variation operators described in Section 2.2.1. 
(3) If better structure is found, then go to step 4; otherwise go to step 2. 
(4) Parametric optimization is found using pseudo-inverse or singular value decomposition (SVD) described in 
Section 2.2.2. 
(5) If the maximum number of local is reached or no better parameter vector is found for a significantly long time, 
then go to step 6; otherwise go to step 4. 
(6) If a satisfactory solution is found, then the algorithm is stopped; otherwise go to step 2. 
 
3 Intrusion Detection Methodology 
 
    For the intrusion detection problem solved in the work reported in this paper, the same steps used for modeling 
general complex systems were used for classification without any modification. The input parameters (attributes of the 
reduced space) and the output parameters (class labels) were divided into training and testing datasets according to the 
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problem description described in Section 4. The training dataset was used used for learning. The input parameters for 
the testing dataset were then presented to the hybrid DE-GMDH system for generalization. The results obtained were 
merely compared with thedesired outputs; if they corresponded, then the test data was classified as with existing class, 
otherwise a new class was created. No further pre-processing was needed. 
 
3.1 Training Phase 
 
The dimension reduction stage has been applied to reduce the feature space. Once the dimension is reduced then it is 
processed by the hybrid DE-GMDH stage. 
 
3.2 Testing Phase 
 
   The test samples are not used for model building but the model built is used for testing. In this paper, we present 
hybrid DE-GMDH-type networks that are comprehensively described by concise short-term polynomials, which are 
comprehensible for computer experts. The parameters used for both dimensional reduction and optimization (DE) are 
given in Table 2. 
 
Tab. 2. Parameter used for both dimensional reduction and optimization (DE) 
Dimensional reduction Parameter values 
Reduced dimension, h 3 
Optimization (DE)  
Population size 50 
Crossover value, CR 0.3 
Mutation value 0.1 
 
4 Experimentation Setup and Results 
 
The experimental dataset used for the intrusion detection problem described in this paper is the BSM audit logs from the 
1998 DARPA data [29]. We use the same dataset that is used by Liao and Vemuri [14], Rawat et al. [17], and Sharma et 
al. [18]. There are 50 unique system calls in the training data. All the 50 system calls are shown in Table 3. There are 
2000 normal sessions reported in the four days of data and the training dataset consists of 605 unique processors. There 
are 412 normal sessions on the fifth day and we extract 5285 normal processes from these sessions. We use the 5285 
normal processes as testing data. In order to test the detection capability of our proposed method, we considered 55 
intrusion sessions as test data as taken by Rawat et al. [17]. But we found that there is one process that is exactly similar 
to the training data and hence we removed it from the session list. Consequently, we consider only 54 intrusion sessions 
instead. Table 4 lists these attacks. A number in the beginning of the name denotes the week and day followed by the 
name of the session (attack). 
     An intrusion session is said to be detected if any of the processes associated with this session is classified as 
abnormal. We define some metric for measuring the quality of our IDS solutions: 
 
sessionintrusion #
)(detectedintrusion #
detection
of
positivestruesessionsofrate =  
 
session #
)(abnormalas detected#
normalof
positivesfalseprocessesnormalofratepositivefalse =  
 
sequencesinput #
##
of
positivesfalseofpositivestrueofaccuracy +=  
 
Tab. 3. Table 2 List of 50 unique system calls 
access, audit, auditon, chdir, chmod, chown, close, 
creat, execve, exit, fchdir, fchown, fcntl, fork, fork1, 
getaudit, getmsg, ioctl, kill, link, login, logout, lstat, 
memcntl, mkdir, mmap, munmap, oldnice, oldsetgid, 
oldsetuid, oldutime, open, pathdonf, pipe, putmsg, 
readlink, rename, rmdir, setaudit, setegid, seteuid, 
setgroups, setpgrp, setrlimit, stat, statvfs, su, sysinfo, 
unlink, vfork 
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Tab. 4. Table 2 List of 54 attacks used in testing dataset 
1.1_it_ffb_clear,   1.1_it_format_clear,  2.2_it_ipsweep, 
2.5_it_ftpwrite,   2.5_it_ftpwrite_test,  3.1_it_ffb_clear, 
3.3_it_ftpwrite,   3.3_it_ftpwrite_test,  3.4_it_warez, 
3.5_it_warezmaster,   4.1_it_080520warezclient, 
4.2_it_080511warezclient,   4.2_it_153736spy, 
4.2_it_15373spy_test,   4.2_it_153812spy, 
4.4_it_080514warezclient,   4.4_it_080514warezclient_test, 
4.4_it_175320warezclient,   4.4_it_180326warezclient, 
4.4_it_180955warezclient,   4.4_it_181945warezclient, 
4.5_it_092212ffb,   4.5_it_141011loadmodule, 
4.5_it_162228loadmodule, 4.5_it_174726loadmodule, 
4.5_it_format,   5.1_it_141020ffb,  5.1_it_174729ffb_exec, 
5.1_it_format,   5.2_it_144308eject_clear, 
5.2_it_163909eject_clear,  5.3_it_eject_steal,  5.5_it_eject, 
5.5_it_fdformat,   5.5_it_fdformat_chmod,  6.4_it_090647ffb, 
6.4_it_093203eject,  6.4_it_095246eject,  6.4_it_100014eject, 
6.4_it_122156eject,  6.4_it_144331ffb,  test.1.2_format, 
test.1.2_format2,  test.1.3_eject,  test.1.3_httptunnel, 
test.1.4_eject,  test.2.1_111516ffb,  test.2.1_format, 
test.2.2_xsnoop,  test.2.3_ps,  test.2.3_ps_b, 
test.2.5_ftpwrite,  test.2.4_eject_a,  test.2.2_format1 
 
 
5 Discussion of Results 
 
Table 5 shows the results for k = 5 using Liao-Vemuri scheme; binary weighted cosine (BWC) by Rawat et al. [17] 
scheme; binary weighted radial basis function (BWRBF) scheme, smooth binary weighted radial basis function 
(SBWRBF) scheme, basis function (RBF) scheme, smooth radial basis function (SRBF) scheme by Sharma et al. [18] 
and the present one in this paper, hybrid DE-GMDH. 
 
Tab. 5. False positive rate versus detection rate for all the techniques 
Method False positive rate in % Detection rate in % 
Liao-Vemuri (Liao andVemuri, 2002a) 22.84 100 
BWC (Rawat et al. 2006) 4.65 100 
BWRBF (Sharma et al., 2007) 0.98 100 
SBWRBF (Sharma et al., 2007) 0.91 100 
RBF (Sharma et al., 2007) 0.44 100 
SRBF (Sharma et al., 2007) 0.38 100 
Present paper: hybrid DE-GMDH 0.00 100 
 
    It can be observed from Table 5 that the false positive rate for Liao-Vemuri scheme is very high (22.84%) at a 
detection rate of 100%. BWC by Rawat et al. [17] performs better than that of Liao-Vemuri scheme with less false 
positive rate (4.65% at a detection rate of 100%). The kernel schemes proposed by Sharma et al. [18] have very small 
false positive rates of 0.98%, 0.91%, 0.44%, and 0.38% at a detection rate of 100% for the BWRBF, SBWRBF, RBF, 
and SRBF schemes respectively. The hybrid DE-GMDH scheme performs better than all other schemes with 0% false 
positive rate and a detection rate of 100%. To the best of our knowledge, the result of the proposed hybrid DE-GMDH 
scheme on this dataset is the best reported result. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
This paper has introduced the hybrid DE-GMDH scheme for solving the intrusion detection problem. The result 
obtained when compared to the best previous BWRBF, SBWRBF, RBF, and SRBF schemes show that the hybrid DE-
GMDH scheme realizes a 0% false positive rate and a detection rate of 100%. It is evident that this is a significant 
achievement in the context of intrusion detection. 
Some of the advantages of the hybrid DE-GMDH scheme over the other schemes for the intrusion detection 
problem are: (i) no similarity measure is needed, (ii) defining thresholds is not necessary, (iii) features defining the 
problem are used directly and their dimension could be reduced using PCA without compromising the solution, (iv) 
computational speed is very high. 
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